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WHY THE SURVIVABILITY ONION SHOULD INCLUDE 






Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability (RAM) and Survivability are both diverse 
disciplines that explore how a system will perform when placed within an operational 
environment. This Joint Applied Project provides a qualitative analysis of the 
interconnectivity of RAM and Survivability. It shows that an in-depth RAM analysis 
ensures military personnel are better protected throughout the life cycle.  Methodologies 
for improving reliability and maintainability are also presented, to include physics of 
failure, highly accelerated life testing/highly accelerated stress screening, preventative 
maintenance determination and pit stop engineering. This analysis uses an Active 
Protection System (APS) to show that, when RAM is included in the Survivability Onion; 
both Survivability and RAM evaluations benefit; survivability assessments become more 
complete; RAM assessments are completed sooner; and ultimately, better systems are put 
into the hands of service members. As APS requirements are developed, it is important 
that they include the Materiel Availability Key Performance Parameter with associated 
Reliability and Ownership Cost Key System Attributes.  When evaluating an APS (or any 
system) the independent evaluator team members need to integrate and discuss the 
impacts of the capabilities and limitations they observed with each other to ensure that 
the deficiencies are properly addressed in the reports.   
vi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. SYSTEM EVALUTIONS ................................................................................1 
B. FOCUS ..............................................................................................................1 
II. SURVIVABILITY .......................................................................................................3 
A. SURVIVABILITY ...........................................................................................3 
1. The Survivability Onion ......................................................................3 
2. The Operational Environment ............................................................5 
III. ACTIVE PROTECTION SYSTEM ...........................................................................7 
A. ACTIVE PROTECTION SYSTEMS ............................................................7 
1. What They Are Designed to Do ........................................................10 
2. How They Work .................................................................................10 
3. Why the DoD is interested .................................................................11 
a. Weight Savings ........................................................................11 
b. Logistic Burden .......................................................................12 
4. Why the DoD is apprehensive ...........................................................13 
a. Complicated .............................................................................13 
b. Trust .........................................................................................13 
IV. SUITABILITY ...........................................................................................................15 
A. SUITABILITY TEST AND EVALUATION OVERVIEW .......................15 
1. Test Incident Reports ........................................................................15 
2. Failure Definition/Scoring Criteria ..................................................15 
3. Sustainment Key Performance Parameter (KPP) ..........................18 
B. RELIABILITY ...............................................................................................18 
1. Definition ............................................................................................18 
2. Reliability Metrics ..............................................................................18 
C. MAINTAINABILITY....................................................................................19 
1. Definitions ...........................................................................................19 
a. Logistics Footprint ..................................................................20 
b. Types of Maintenance .............................................................20 
2. Maintainability Metrics .....................................................................21 
D. AVAILABILITY ............................................................................................22 
1. Definitions ...........................................................................................22 
2. Availability Metrics ...........................................................................22 
V. APS AVAILABILITY ENHANCES SURVIVABILITY .......................................25 
A. WHY RAM BECOMES ESSENTIAL IN SURVIVABILITY ONION 
WHEN APS ARE USED ...............................................................................25 
1. Reliability Enhances Dependability. ................................................25 
2. Maintainability Enhances Trust. ......................................................26 
3. Availability Enhances Survivability .................................................29 
viii 
B. MAKE IMPROVEMENTS TO RELIABILITY AND 
MAINTAINABILITY AND SURVIVABILITY WILL IMPROVE ........30 
1. Reliability Improvements ..................................................................30 
a. FMEA/FMECA .......................................................................31 
b. FRACAS ..................................................................................32 
c. HALT/HASS............................................................................32 
d. PoF ..........................................................................................32 
2. Maintainability Improvements .........................................................33 
a. Preventative Maintenance ......................................................33 
b. Pit-Stop Engineering...............................................................33 
VI. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................35 
A. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................35 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS ...............................................................................35 
LIST OF REFERENCES ......................................................................................................37 




LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. The Survivability Onion (From Wilkes, 2007) ..................................................4 
Figure 2. Abrams Front Glacis (After http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Abrams-
transparent.png) .................................................................................................8 
Figure 3. Iron Curtain APS (From Defense Update, 2013).............................................10 
Figure 4. Iron Curtain Sensing, Striking, and Mitigating a RPG Threat (From 
Defense Update, 2013).....................................................................................11 
Figure 5. Sample Scoring Process (From HQ TRADOC, 1995, p8) ..............................17 
Figure 6. Operational Availability (From DAU , 2013) ..................................................23 
 
x 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
xi 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
ACAT  Acquisition Category 
APS  Active Protection System 
ADT  Administrative Downtime 
AO  Operational Availability 
AM  Materiel Availability 
APS  Active Protection System 
AR  Army Regulation 
ATEC  Army Test and Evaluation Command 
CFE  Contractor Furnished Equipment 
CIA  Critical Item Analysis 
CMT  Corrective Maintenance Time 
DA PAM Department of the Army Pamphlet 
DAU  Defense Acquisition University 
DoD  Department of Defense 
EFF  Essential Function Failures 
FCA  Failure Compensation Analysis 
FDSC  Failure Definition/Scoring Criteria 
FMEA  Failure Modes Effect and Analysis 
FMECA Failure Modes Effects and Criticality Analysis 
FRACAS Failure Reporting, Analysis, and Corrective Action System 
FSR  Field Service Representative 
GFE  Government Furnished Equipment 
HALT  Highly Accelerated Life Testing 
HASS  Highly Accelerated Stress Testing 
HMMWV High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle 
HQ  Headquarters 
HQDA  Headquarters Department of the Army 
IED  Improvised Explosive Device 
ILS  Integrated Logistics Support 
IPT  Integrated Product Team 
xii 
JCIDS  Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 
KPP  Key Performance Parameter 
KSA  Key System Attribute 
LDT  Logistics Downtime 
MANPRINT Manpower and Personnel Integration 
MLDT  Mean Logistics Downtime 
MMBEFF Mean Miles Between Essential Function Failure 
MMT  Mean Maintenance Time 
MRAP  Mine Resistant Ambush Protected 
MRBF  Mean Rounds Between Failures 
MTBF  Mean Time Between Failures 
MTBM Mean Time Between Maintenance 
MTBSA Mean Time Between System Aborts 
MTTR  Mean Time To Repair 
NEFF  Non-Essential Function Failure 
OIF  Operation Iraqi Freedom 
OTA  Operational Test Agency 
PMT  Preventative Maintenance Time 
PoF  Physics of Failure 
RAM  Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability 
RPA Risk Priority Analysis 
RPG Ruchnoy Protivotankovy Granatomyot (translation: hand-held antitank 
grenade launcher) 
SA  System Abort 
TEMP  Test and Evaluation Master Plan 
TIR  Test Incident Report 
TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command 




Meghan and Rob would like to thank their advisors, Brad Naegle and Diana 
Petross, for all of their guidance while completing this project.   
Meghan would also like to thank her husband, Michael, for all the love, support, 
patience and understanding he provided while she completed this; and for taking care of 
their two little girls so that she could have peace and quiet to concentrate.  She would also 
like to thank Rob for being her partner.  She was amazed by his selfless service while 
volunteering to be deployed as a civilian for six months and his dedication to continuing 
his hard work on this as well as the rest of the class work.  
Rob would like to acknowledge the patience, compassion and support of his 
family and fiancé (Alexis).  They have offered unwavering encouragement, even when he 
has outlandish ideas (like taking part in a six-month deployment to Kabul while 
maintaining the workload necessary to graduate on time), and he wouldn’t be the person 
he is without them.  He would also like to acknowledge the ATEC FOA XX Team, 
especially his “battle buddy” LTC Chavez, for opening his eyes to what our service 
members are subjected to, and the strength that they show in the face of adversity.  He 
would also be remiss if he didn’t acknowledge the work of his partner, Meghan, whose 
professionalism, character, and composure were awe-inspiring.  He has been humbled 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
A. SYSTEM EVALUTIONS 
As a program progresses through the acquisition process, the Operational Test 
Agency (OTA) tests and evaluates the effectiveness, suitability and survivability of the 
system. The evaluations for these systems are completed by multiple action officers with 
their own areas of expertise. For example, at the Army Test and Evaluation Command 
(ATEC, 2010), an Acquisition Category (ACAT) I program may have seven different 
people writing the OTA Evaluation Reports. Under effectiveness, there are typically 
performance and safety evaluators; under suitability, there are typically Reliability, 
Availability, and Maintainability (RAM), Integrated Logistics Support (ILS), and 
Manpower and Personnel Integration (MANPRINT) evaluators; and under survivability 
there are typically ballistics and non-ballistics evaluators. Each section of the report is 
written independently of the others, and then combined into one report. The issue is that 
each independent evaluation can have an affect the on the other systems. Service 
members may not be able to effectively complete their missions if reliability or training is 
poor. Soldier survivability is at risk if a system cannot effectively mitigate threats. It is 
important that these interactions are discussed and included in the overall evaluation.    
B. FOCUS 
This paper focuses on the interaction of RAM and Survivability and why RAM 
should be included in the Survivability Onion.  Active Protection Systems (APS) will be 
used as an example to explore the interdependency and importance of RAM to 
survivability.  The research will demonstrate how APS reliability enhances system 
dependability, APS maintainability enhances trust, and APS availability enhances 
survivability.  The analysis will illustrate how RAM and the Survivability Onion (Deitz, 
Reed, Klopcic & Walbert, 2009)interconnect and complement each other by using 
examples of an APS, and other Army systems. 
Survivability evaluations and RAM evaluations mutually benefit when they are 
done in concert.  Survivability evaluations benefit by having the ability to assess how a 
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system’s survivability will be affected over time, and RAM evaluations benefit by having 
the ability to assess how the suitability of the system will affect Soldier Survivability.  
Survivability evaluations benefit because systems under test are typically fresh off the 
assembly line and have not been subjected to the operational environment due to 
schedule constraints (i.e., the Survivability evaluation must be done before the system is 
fielded).  RAM evaluations benefit because systems under test typically do not have 
service member (i.e., soldiers, sailors, airmen, or marines) involvement until operational 
tests, and by that point, system designs become much more difficult and costly to change 
to increase the system’s suitability.  Therefore, this analysis will use an APS to show that 
when RAM is included in the Survivability Onion; both Survivability and RAM 
evaluations benefit; Survivability assessments become more complete; RAM assessments 




A. SURVIVABILITY  
Survivability can be, and is, defined many ways. However, for the extent of this 
Project, “Survivability” will be defined as: 
The total capability of a system (resulting from the synergism among 
personnel, materiel, design, tactics, and doctrine) to avoid, withstand, or 
recover from damage to a system or crew in hostile (man-made or natural) 
environments without suffering an abortive impairment of its ability to 
accomplish its designated mission. (Deitz et al., 2009, p. 2).  
Basically, Deitz et al. (2009) introduces two important aspects of Survivability: 
The Survivability Onion, and The Operational Environment.  
1. The Survivability Onion 
The Survivability Onion is a symbolic title that illustrates the different layers, or 
opportunities, a platform has to mitigate the effects of a given threat. The “layers” of the 
Survivability Onion are illustrated in Figure 2, below developed by Dr. David Wilkes 






Figure 1.   The Survivability Onion (From Wilkes, 2007) 
The Survivability Onion can also be described as: Don’t be seen. If you are seen, 
don’t be targeted/acquired.  If you are targeted/acquired, don’t be hit.  If you are hit, don’t 
be penetrated.  If you are penetrated, don’t be killed.   
Consider at the onion from the perspective of the unfortunate combat system in 
the middle of Figure 1.  Each layer of the survivability onion shows how the vehicle can 
partially or completely mitigate a potential threat.  The first layer of the onion is “Don’t 
be seen,” or a threat is on the lookout and the vehicle doesn’t want to be spotted.  At this 
layer, the vehicle can hide in a forest, apply camouflage, the crew can dig a hole that 
hides it up to the turret, the engine can be turned off to place the vehicle into silent watch, 
or take some other actions to not be spotted.   
The second layer is “Don’t be targeted,” or a threat has now at least partially seen 
the vehicle and is aiming at it trying to acquire for engagement.  At this layer, the vehicle 
can generate smoke obscuring itself, fire lasers damaging optics, distract an aggressor 
with loud noises, fire weapons at the threat, move rapidly, or take some other actions to 
not be targeted.   
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The third layer is “Don’t be hit,” or a threat has at least partially seen and 
acquired the vehicle and is now engaging.  At this layer, the vehicle can fire flares, move 
to dodge the incoming round, engage the threat with weapons, or some other actions to 
not be hit. 
The fourth layer is “Don’t be penetrated,” or a threat has at least partially seen, 
acquired, and hit the vehicle, and now we’re trying to mitigate the threat’s weapon 
effects.  At this layer, the vehicle is depending on its armor, and other protective 
subsystems, to protect its crew and critical subsystems from any direct assaults. 
The fifth, and final, layer is “Don’t be killed,” or a threat has at least partially 
seen, acquired, hit, and penetrated the vehicle, and now the threat is affecting the crew 
and subsystems within the vehicle itself.  At this layer, the vehicle is depending on spall 
liners, compartmentalization, personnel protective gear, fire extinguishers, and other 
protection measures to keep the crew from being injured, critical subsystems being 
damaged, and the vehicle’s mission being affected. 
This concept basically breaks an engagement down into different steps where 
each step allows the system the ability to reduce, or mitigate, the effects from a given 
threat. The idea is that the system/user should be able to maintain sufficient effectiveness 
to complete the mission after an event has occurred. The events occur within the confines 
of The Operational Environment.  
2. The Operational Environment 
The Operational Environment is any environment where the system is expected to 
perform its intended missions, and these environments contain various threats that may 
act upon the system. The threats may be legion, and varied, but are typically detailed in 
the system’s requirements documents as well as the System Threat Assessment Report, 
which is typically produced by intelligence sources.  There are several organizations that 
can put together threat assessments, but the National Ground Intelligence Center’s Anti-
Armor Analysis Program, based out of Charlottesville, Virginia, typically provides Army 
system threat assessments. 
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Afghanistan is one example of an operational environment.  The military has 
collected a significant amount of data about Afghanistan and the insurgent groups in the 
area and their military tactics. For instance, we know that the area around Kandahar is 
typically dusty and hot, and that opposing forces may use Soviet era weaponry that was 
left in the area while the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan between the middle of 1988 
and early 1989.  This gives us a picture of the operational environment around Kandahar 
and with this knowledge; we can better prepare a system to survive in that environment. 
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III. ACTIVE PROTECTION SYSTEM 
A. ACTIVE PROTECTION SYSTEMS 
An APS will likely be found on the military platforms of the future. The 
Department of Defense (DoD) is currently engaged in Afghanistan, but is in the process 
of retrograding the forces employed in the region.  The DoD is evaluating the future of 
the forces as these forces come home.  Currently several platforms use bulky armor 
systems to mitigate the Operational Environment’s threats.  Because of the additional 
weight, dimensions, and added transportation, these armor systems place a massive strain 
on logistic systems and lead to higher life cycle costs. 
The most survivable systems for the current operational environment (i.e., 
Afghanistan) tend to be gargantuan.  Heavy armor was the most typical solution after 
analyzing the operational environment through the lens of the Survivability Onion, with 
an understanding of the tactics being used by insurgent groups.  First, the tactics typically 
used by insurgent groups, especially against vehicle convoys, are not direct force-on-
force engagements.  They prefer to attack quickly and with as mines and improvised 
roadside explosives operated by few or no people.  This is why the under-vehicle 
Improvised Explosive Device (IED) and Ruchnoy Protivotankovy Granatomyot (RPG) 
(English translation: hand-held antitank grenade launcher) have become insurgent 
weapons of choice.  These devices allow them to be hidden from view and catch 
unsuspecting coalition forces by surprise.  
Consider the Survivability Onion, and envision a surprise attack scenario where 
an insurgent group, with a RPG, is waiting for a coalition convoy to pass by unaware of 
the threat. .  The insurgent group is already circumventing the “Don’t be seen” and 
“Don’t be targeted” levels of the Survivability Onion. Therefore, the convoy is already 
put at a disadvantage and, assuming the insurgent group has received adequate training or 
is moderately experienced with the RPG (and that our example convoy does not have 
APSs), the insurgent group has a relatively high probability of hitting a vehicle in our 
example convoy.  The vehicle example now has lost three layers of the Survivability 
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Onion (“Don’t be seen,” “Don’t be targeted,” and “Don’t be hit”) because current 
convoys cannot effectively control being seen or targeted, and the insurgent group was 
adequately experienced with the RPG and had the element of surprise on their side.   
The vehicle, in this example, can be any platform. It can be an Abrams tank, a 
Bradley Fighting Vehicle, a ¾ Ton truck, a Jeep, or a Toyota pickup.  However, assume 
for a moment it is a Stryker (armored, wheeled platform).  The Stryker that has been 
struck in our example by the RPG round, is now “seeing” the threat at the “Don’t be 
penetrated” level of the Survivability Onion.  The RPG round is designed to penetrate the 
vehicle’s protective armor to cause injuries to the crew and damage to crucial 
subsystems, so the theoretical Stryker’s armor is now tasked with stopping the RPG 
round and prevent injuries and damage.  Therefore the Stryker’s armor package needs to 
be designed in such a way that it prevents or mitigates the penetration of a RPG threat. 
Typically, the way penetrating threats are mitigated are through geometric and 
bulk solutions.  Basically, if you angle an armor plate, or increase its thickness, you’re 
causing a penetrating threat to have to penetrate more armor to achieve penetration.  A 
good example of this is the front glacis on the Abrams (the angled parts on the front of 
the turret on either side of the cannon as noted on Figure 2), where the angle and bulk of 
armor plate makes it harder for penetrating threats to penetrate the armor. 
   
Figure 2.   Abrams Front Glacis (After http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Abrams-
transparent.png) 
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However, there is a tradeoff, the increased armor also increases weight to the 
platform (our example above of the Abrams is a very massive platform which, fully 
loaded, can weigh in excess of 70 tons). The more weight added to a platform increases 
it’s logistical challenges.  
 The added weight impacts logistics in several ways:  transporting the systems to 
the theater of operations is more difficult and costly; the systems require more powerful 
engines and consume significantly more fuel; and the armor weight can stress suspension 
and braking systems, adding to the total logistics burden. 
One of the most taxing missions for the United States Forces Afghanistan 
(USFOR-A) is moving these massive platforms from place to place and decision makers 
must make difficult decisions.  The Army alone, as of June 2013, had “about $25 billion 
in military equipment sitting in Afghanistan,” but not all of that equipment will be 
coming home; the “Army has only decided to ship back 76 percent of its equipment, 
which will cost $2 to $3 billion just in transportation” (Fisher, 2013, para.4).  These 
transportation costs are huge, and are so partially because of armor packages’ weight. 
Afghanistan is a landlocked country that borders six other nations (Pakistan, Iran, 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and China), so to move a massive platform, you 
basically have two options; over land, or by air.  The geography of the Hindu Kush 
mountain range and arid deserts of Afghanistan can slow over land deliveries, so air is 
usually the transportation method of choice.  However, platforms with massive armor 
packages are difficult to fit into the cargo aircraft typically used by the military while still 
allowing the airplanes to get off the ground at all.  This causes more trips to be taken and 
the price to go up, adds to logistic backlogs, and headaches for logistics staff. 
These behemoth systems do effectively save lives in the current operational 
environment, but they are quickly becoming unattractive in our current fiscal 
environment. What are needed are systems that will cause less life cycle burdens, while 
providing similar, or better, levels of protection. Therefore, APS are poised to become 
essential in the near future. 
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1. What They Are Designed to Do 
APS are designed to actively protect the systems they are integrated upon. They 
constantly scan the operational environment to detect potential threats that could damage 
the system they are integrated with and mitigate those threats. 
2. How They Work 
The currently deployed armor packages are designed to work at the “Don’t be 
penetrated” level of the Survivability Onion. However, an APS is designed to work at the 
“Don’t be targeted” or “Don’t be hit” level, because they typically interact with the threat 
some distance away from the platform itself. These systems attempt to expand the 
protective boundaries around the host platform, and increased distance from a threat 
event typically increases survivability.   
One example of an APS is the Iron Curtain.  The Iron Curtain is shown in Figure 
3. (The Iron Curtain is the horizontal bar offset from the roofline of the base platform.) 
 
Figure 3.   Iron Curtain APS (From Defense Update, 2013) 
The Iron Curtain uses electronic sensors and defeat mechanisms to sense, and 
mitigate, incoming threats.  The procession below shows how this sense and defeat 
process is supposed to work.  Note: This is not an endorsement of the Iron Curtain 
system, or any specific system developer, it is simply being used as an example of an 
APS. 
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Figure 4.   Iron Curtain Sensing, Striking, and Mitigating a RPG Threat 
(From Defense Update, 2013) 
Figure 4 shows three panes of a RPG threat engagement by the Iron Curtain APS.  
The engagement is demonstrated with the threat coming in from the left side of the frame 
and being fired at a simulated vehicle platform.  The Iron Curtain is hung, as shown 
above, from the “roofline” of the platform, which means that the plate hanging below the 
Iron Curtain is the simulated platform’s base armor, and behind that plate (to the right of 
the frame) is the “crew compartment” of the simulated platform.  The first pane shows 
the RPG threat coming in from the left side; the Iron Curtain has sensed the threat and 
triggered its defeat mechanism.  The second pane shows the defeat mechanism firing at, 
and striking, the RPG threat.  The third pane shows that the RPG threat has been 
mitigated because the simulated base armor has not been penetrated (we would be able to 
see visible ejecta to the right of the simulated base armor showing that the threat has 
gotten past the Iron Curtain, through the base armor and into the “crew compartment”). 
3. Why the DoD is interested  
An APS can be a powerful ally in the future of constrained program budgets. 
a. Weight Savings 
An APS can weigh orders of magnitude less than a Rolled Homogenous 
Armor (RHA) package capable of defeating the same threat. The physical size of these 
two systems can lead to efficient production systems completing APS 
production/installation runs quicker than they could a comparable RHA package. 
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The Iron Curtain in Figure 4 is about three feet long, weighs less than 200 
pounds, and let’s assume for this calculation the defeat mechanism is effective for three 
feet below the Iron Curtain.  That gives us a three foot by three foot area in which the 
Iron Curtain can effectively mitigate a RPG threat.  Now, assume that threat is a typical 
RPG threat, like the RPG-7V (state of the art circa 1961) which has a RHA penetration 
capability of a little over 10 inches (0.833 feet) (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RPG-7).  
The density of RHA is approximately 485 pounds per cubic foot 
(http://www.alternatewars.com/BBOW/Ballistics/Armor_Material.htm), so the weight of 
a RHA plate that would have at least the capability of our example Iron Curtain would 
be: 
3 ft x 3 ft x 0.833 ft x 485 lb/ft3 = 3640 lbs 
 
This example shows that our example Iron Curtain, which weighs less 
than 200 lbs, has similar capabilities against our example RPG-7V as a 3,640 lb RHA 
plate.  That is more than a 94% weight savings in this example. 
b. Logistic Burden 
The Iron Curtain versus RHA Plate example above can also show us the 
logistic burdens of these two solutions.  The Iron Curtain, at less than 200 pounds, could 
be effectively transported short distances by a small team of personnel.  The RHA Plate 
on the other hand, at 3,640 pounds, isn’t moving without at least a forklift present for 
assistance. 
For our example Iron Curtain system, which we already assumed is three 
feet long, has a cross section of about one foot; that would make the volume of the 
system approximately three cubic feet.  Also, remember our example RHA Plate with the 
comparable protection is 7.5 cubic feet (3 ft x 3 ft x 0.833 ft).  That means the example 
Iron Curtain is 60% smaller, and remains 94% lighter, than the comparable RHA Plate.  
Those space and weight savings mean that fewer trucks, or planes, are needed to transport 
a comparable protection package which means less fuel is consumed and less time is 
spent in transit, leading to cost savings throughout the logistic chain. 
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4. Why the DoD is apprehensive 
However, these systems do have drawbacks. 
a. Complicated 
APS can be complicated. Their defeat mechanism will typically be 
controlled through computer software that needs to measure, understand, and act upon 
collected sensor data with extreme reliability. The system will also not have very much 
time to correctly figure whether or not its sensors have found a genuine threat that 
requires action. Threats may only be in the APS’s effective defeat zone for milliseconds. 
b. Trust 
An APS will suffer from trust issues in the near future. Service members 
are used to large armor systems protecting them from threats in the operational 
environment. When they are asked to trust this new system with markedly less base 
armor, there will likely be an adjustment period. This also means that any APS must have 
the same, or greater, protection that a comparable RHA package. If the APS cannot 
protect a platform’s crew better than what service members are accustom to, they will 
begin to question why the APS has been tasked with their protection. 
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IV. SUITABILITY 
A. SUITABILITY TEST AND EVALUATION OVERVIEW 
During the acquisition process, a system goes through multiple tests and 
evaluations.  Suitability test and evaluation starts with the defining of requirements by the 
combat developer.  Once the requirements are established the testing is planned and 
should be based on the needs of the evaluator.  The types and lengths of tests will depend 
upon the system requirements and will be described in the system’s Test and Evaluation 
Master Plan (TEMP).  For instance, a helicopter will need to be flown for an evaluator 
determined number of hours while a vehicle will need to be driven for a determined 
number of miles.  These hours and miles will be accumulated through both 
developmental and operational testing.  Also, a logistics demonstration will be 
completed.  As defined by the DAU glossary, a logistics demonstration is used to 
evaluate the adequacy of the system support package and ensure the user unit has the 
logistical capability to achieve initial operational capability. 
(https://dap.dau.mil/glossary/) 
1. Test Incident Reports 
Test Incident Reports (TIRs) are required to be collected at all test events in the 
TEMP in accordance with Army Regulation (AR) 73-1: Test and Evaluation Policy 
(Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA), 2006).  Per AR 73-1 (HQDA, 2006, 
p.33), “a TIR describes the minimum essential data for test incidents as they occur, their 
respective corrective actions and status, and other test information.” Specifically, a TIR 
includes when the incident occurred, an incident description of what actually happened 
and the function lost, how it was fixed, how long it took to fix, who performed the 
maintenance, spare parts usage, and when it was returned to service.     
2. Failure Definition/Scoring Criteria 
Throughout and at the conclusion of the test, dependent upon the test length and 
number of TIRs,, the RAM Integrated Product Team (IPT) convene to determine the TIR 
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scores.  The RAM IPT scoring conference members consist of a representative from the 
materiel developer (Program Manager), combat developer (Training and Doctrine 
Command (TRADOC)), and independent evaluator (ATEC).  A TRADOC written 
Failure Definition/Scoring Criteria (FDSC) is used as guidelines to score the TIRs that 
were generated during the event.  Per Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA PAM) 70-3 
(HQDA, 2009, p.88), “The FDSC defines the required functionality and allowable levels 
of degradation (in other words, what constitutes a reliability failure) and establishes a 
framework for classifying and charging test incidents.”  
According to the Guidelines for Developing Reliability Failure Definition and 
Scoring Criteria (Headquarters (HQ) TRADOC Combat Developments Engineering 
Division, 1995), the FDSC is split into 2 major areas, the failure definition and scoring 
criteria.  As part of the failure definition portion, the FDSC establishes the essential 
functions of the system (for example, the essential functions of a cargo helicopter would 
be fly, communicate, navigate, survive, sling load, and internal load).  The purpose of the 
failure definition is to ultimately describe, from a user’s perspective, degraded and 
unacceptable performance which, when evidenced by component or subsystem 
malfunction, is considered a failure (HQ TRADOC, 1995, p2). 
Primary failure categories are Non-Essential Function Failure (NEFF), Essential 
Function Failure (EFF), and System Abort (SA).  An EFF is generally described as a 
failure or malfunction causing degradation below an established level or causing 
complete loss of an essential function(s).  If loss or degradation of the function(s) results 
in immediately removing the system from service, the failure is not only an EFF, but also 
an SA.  An SA generally precludes ability to enter into use or to continue in use.  Take 
for instance you are on your way to work and your radio stops working.  This would be 
scored as a NEFF because your radio is not required for your commute.  However, if your 
wheel falls off, it would be an EFF and more specifically a SA, as you would no longer 
be able to drive your car.  
The second part of the FDSC is the scoring criteria.  The scoring criteria should 
outline a specific process for classifying test events into proper categories and for 
charging failures to appropriate causes. (HQ TRADOC, 1995, p7) Classification of an 
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event is made based upon the event’s impact on system operational performance.  
Primary classification categories are: No Test, Non-Failure, and Failure.  Figure 5 depicts 
an example of the scoring process and what type of event falls in each category. 
 
Figure 5.   Sample Scoring Process (From HQ TRADOC, 1995, p8)    
Following through the scoring process, the next step is assigning chargeability, 
which is what caused the failure to occur.  Typical chargeabilities are Contractor 
Furnished Equipment (CFE) hardware and software, Government Furnished Equipment 
(GFE) hardware and software, crew/operator, maintenance personnel, technical 
documentation/manuals, training, support equipment, and unknown. 
After the TIRs have been scored, the independent evaluator assesses the 
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3. Sustainment Key Performance Parameter (KPP) 
Key Performance Parameters (KPPs) are defined in the Defense Acquisition 
University (DAU) glossary (https://dap.dau.mil/glossary/) as, “Those attributes or 
characteristics of a system that are considered critical or essential to the development of 
an effective military capability and that make a significant contribution to the 
characteristics of the future joint force.” DoD has deemed certain KPPs mandatory under 
specific conditions. Among these, the Sustainment KPP is required for all Acquisition 
ACAT I programs requiring a materiel solution; for ACAT II and below programs, the 
sponsor will determine the applicability of this KPP. The Sustainment KPP has three 
elements, an Availability KPP made up of two components, Materiel Availability (AM) 
and Operational Availability (AO) and two Key System Attributes (KSAs), Ownership 
Cost and Reliability. These are further defined below. (JROC, 2012) 
B. RELIABILITY 
1. Definition 
According to the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) (https://dap.dau.mil 
/glossary/), reliability is the probability that an item will perform in a satisfactory manner 
in its intended operational environment over time, without failure. An item’s reliability 
depends on how well it is designed, the quality of the materials used, the quality of the 
manufacturing process, and it proper operational use in its intended operating 
environment. The failure rate is used to measure reliability, which refers to the frequency 
with which a system fails over time.  In simplest terms, reliability is the ability of a 
system and its parts to perform the mission without failure, degradation, or the demand 
on the support system under a prescribed set of conditions 
(https://dap.dau.mil/acquipedia). 
2. Reliability Metrics 
In the Test and Evaluation of System Reliability Availability Maintainability-A 
primer, Colin, Lilius, and Tubbesing (1982) define Mean Time Between Failures 
(MTBF) as the total functioning life of a population of an item during a specific 
measurement interval, divided by the total number of failures within the population 
19 
during that interval. MTBF can be interpreted as the expected length of time a system 
will be operational between failures. The definition is true for time, cycles, miles, events, 
or other measure-of-life units. These various measure-of-life units permit the MTBF term 
to be tailored to the reliability requirements of a specific system. Some examples of this 
tailoring are: a gun may have a Mean Rounds Between Failures (MRBF) of 10,000 
rounds, a HMMWV may have Mean Miles Between Essential Function Failure 
(MMBEFF) requirement of 1,000 miles, and an unmanned aircraft may have a Mean 
Time Between System Aborts (MTBSA) of 100 flight hours. 
Failure rate is defined as the number of failures of an item per measure of life unit 
(e.g., cycles, time, miles or events as applicable) (Colin, et al., 1982).  This measure is 
more difficult to visualize from an operational standpoint than the MTBF measure, but is 
a useful mathematical term, which frequently appears in many engineering and statistical 
calculation.  It is the reciprocal of the MTBF measure. 
Mission Reliability is the probability that a system will perform mission essential 
functions for a period of time under the conditions stated in the mission profile (Colin, et 
al., 1982).  Mission reliability for a single shot type of system, i.e., a missile, would not 
include a time period constraint. A system with high mission reliability has a high 
probability of successfully completing the defined mission. Measures of mission 
reliability address only those incidents that affect mission accomplishment. For example, 
a helicopter may have a mission reliability requirement of an 85% probability of 
completing a 5 hour mission without experiencing an essential function failure. 
C. MAINTAINABILITY 
1. Definitions 
As defined in the DAU Lifecycle Logistics 101 Course Materials (DAU, 2013), 
maintainability pertains to the ease, accuracy, safety, and economy in the performance of 
maintenance actions. It is the ability of an item to be retained in, or restored to, a specific 
condition when maintenance is performed by personnel having specified skill levels, 
using prescribed procedures and resources, at each prescribed level of maintenance and 
repair.  
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a. Logistics Footprint 
A logistics footprint is a term that includes personnel, supplies/equipment, 
and real property (land and facilities) necessary to deploy and sustain a weapon system 
(DAU, 2013).  A large logistics footprint can adversely affect how quickly a military 
force can deploy and how effectively it can be sustained 
If logisticians are spending too much time coordinating with the various 
organizations on acquiring, packaging, shipping and storing more material than will be 
utilized by service member needs, that spells trouble (i.e. higher operational costs). 
Measuring a system's logistics footprint requires consideration of many 
elements: personnel (government and contractor), inventory, support and test equipment, 
facilities, transportation assets, and real estate. The following are examples of how a 
logistics footprint can be measured: weight (total weight of deployable consumables, 
support equipment, energy (fuel, oil, etc.), and spares); personnel (total number of 
personnel (government and contractor) in the deployed area required to transport and 
sustain the weapon system); and volume (total volume (usually measured in cubic feet) of 
deployable consumables, support equipment, fuel, and spares (DAU, 2013). 
The size of the logistics footprint is driven largely by the system's 
reliability and maintainability. If a system has unreliable components, you will need more 
spares, maintenance personnel, and support equipment to maintain the system. 
Designing-in reliability is the best approach to minimizing the logistics footprint. 
b. Types of Maintenance 
Preventative maintenance is defined in the DAU glossary as: All actions 
performed in an attempt to retain an item in a specified condition by providing systematic 
inspection, detection, and prevention of incipient failures. For example, you replace your 
brake pads when they are worn beyond a specific level.  Scheduled maintenance is 
preventive maintenance performed at prescribed points in the item’s life. For example, 
every 6,000 miles, you change the oil in your car. 
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Corrective Maintenance (also known as unscheduled maintenance) is 
defined in the DAU glossary as: all actions performed because of a failure to restore an 
item to a specified condition. Corrective maintenance can include any or all of the 
following steps: localization, isolation, disassembly, interchange, reassembly, alignment, 
and checkout.  Corrective maintenance can be as simple as resetting a computer or as 
complex as replacing an engine. 
2. Maintainability Metrics 
Maintainability can be assessed using Mean Time To Repair (MTTR), which is 
calculated by dividing the total corrective maintenance time by the number of repair 
actions. Corrective maintenance time includes diagnostic time, time to repair, and time to 
verify the repair. Mean Maintenance Time (MMT) is calculated by adding the preventive 
and corrective maintenance time and dividing by the sum of scheduled and unscheduled 
maintenance events during a stated period of time. Another useful maintainability metric 
is Mean Time Between Maintenance (MTBM), which includes preventative maintenance 
in addition to corrective actions. It is calculated by dividing the operating time by the 
total number of maintenance actions. 
One example of these metrics would be a fleet of 100 HMMWVs that, on 
average, are in the shop once a month, and the mechanics typically can get all the 
preventative maintenance done in an hour, but this month some of these HMMWVs (let’s 
assume one in ten) have been having trouble with their engine requiring an engine swap-
out that takes two hours.  For this example, assuming a 30 day month and 24 hour 
operations for each truck when they’re not in the shop, our MTTR, MMT, and MTBM 
are as follows: 
MTTR: 2 hours corrective maintenance/ 1 engine= 2 hours 
MMT: (100 trucks * 1 hour [preventative maintenance] + 10 trucks * 2 hours 
[corrective maintenance] / 110 total maintenance actions = 1.09 hours 
MTBM: (90 trucks * (29 days + 23 hours) + 10 trucks * (29 days + 21 hours)) / 
110 total maintenance actions = 653.45 hours = 27 days and 5.45 hours 
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The lower that MTTR and MMT are, and the longer the MTBM is, the more time 
a system can be in the hands of the users and the more time a user has around a system 
the more familiarity is built with that system. 
D. AVAILABILITY 
1. Definitions 
Per Colin, et al. (1982), Availability is a measure of the degree to which an item is 
operable and can be committed at the start of a mission when the mission is called for at 
an unknown (random) point in time. It is defined as uptime divided by total system time, 
where total system time is uptime plus downtime. Colin et al. (1982) further breaks down 
availability into three metric types: Inherent, Achieved, and Operational Availability.  A 
fourth type (Materiel Availability) was more recently established in accordance with the 
Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) Manual (2012). 
2. Availability Metrics 
Inherent availability reflects the designed-in levels of readiness if everything 
works as predicted and all required logistics support is immediately available. It is a 
combination of the “inherent” design characteristics of reliability and maintainability. It 
is measured as MTBF divided by the sum of MTBF and MTTR. 
Achieved Availability is availability of a system with respect to operating time 
and both corrective and preventive maintenance. It may be calculated as MTBM divided 
by the sum of MTBM and MMT. 
Operational Availability (AO) is the degree to which one can expect a piece of 
equipment or weapon system to work properly when it is required, that is, the percent of 
time the equipment or weapon system is available for use. AO represents system “uptime” 
and considers the effect of reliability, maintainability, and mean logistics delay time. It is 
the quantitative link between readiness objectives and supportability. Figure 1 shows the 
inputs which are used to calculate the AO.   
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Figure 6.   Operational Availability (From DAU , 2013) 
AO may also be calculated by dividing MTBM by the sum of the MTBM, MMT, 
and Mean Logistics Delay Time (MLDT), that is: 
AO = MTBM / (MTBM +MMT + MLDT), 
Where MLDT is defined as the average time a system is awaiting maintenance 
and generally includes time for 1) Locating parts and tools, 2) Locating, setting up or 
calibrating test equipment, 3) Dispatching personnel 4) Reviewing technical manuals, 5) 
Complying with supply procedures, and 6) Awaiting transportation. The MLDT is largely 
dependent upon the logistics support structure and environment.  
Materiel Availability (AM) is defined as the measure of the percentage of the total 
inventory of a system operationally capable (ready for tasking) of performing an assigned 
mission at a given time, based on materiel condition. It addresses the total population of 
end items planned for operational use, including those temporarily in a non-operational 
status once placed into service (such as for depot-level maintenance). The total life cycle 
timeframe, from placement into operational service through the planned end of service 
life, must be included. (JROC, 2012). 
AM requires comprehensive analysis of the system and its planned use, including 
the planned operating environment, operating tempo, reliability alternatives, maintenance 
approaches, and supply chain solutions. Materiel Availability is primarily determined by 
system downtime, both planned and unplanned. It requires the early examination and 
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determination of critical factors, such as the total number of end items to be fielded and 
the major categories and drivers of system downtime. AM is expressed as the Number of 
Operational End Items divided by the Total Population.  
Ownership Cost provides balance to the sustainment solution by ensuring that the 
operations and support (O&S) costs associated with Availability are considered in 
making decisions (https://dap.dau.mil/acquipedia/). For consistency and to capitalize on 
existing efforts in this area, the Cost Analysis Improvement Group O&S Cost Estimating 
Structure will be used in support of this KSA (http://www.dtic.mil/pae/). As a minimum 
the following cost elements are required: 2.0 Unit Operations (2.1.1 (only) Energy (fuel, 
petroleum, oil, lubricants, electricity)); 3.0 Maintenance (All); 4.0 Sustaining Support 
(All except 4.1, System Specific Training); 5.0 Continuing System Improvements (All). 
The O&S value should cover the planned lifecycle timeframe, consistent with the 
timeframe used in the Materiel Availability metric (https://dap.dau.mil/acquipedia/). 
Development of the Ownership Cost metric is a program manager responsibility.  
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V.  APS AVAILABILITY ENHANCES SURVIVABILITY 
A. WHY RAM BECOMES ESSENTIAL IN SURVIVABILITY ONION WHEN 
APS ARE USED 
A fielded APS must be effective, because if the APS is not effective at mitigating 
the threats it is designed to mitigate, there are massive safety concerns with putting that 
APS into the field.  However, even if an APS is effective, acceptance of these systems by 
men and women on the ground will still be essential for their success. Service members 
will need to be convinced to trust their lives to these systems and that is why Reliability, 
Maintainability and Availability of the APS will be so essential. 
1. Reliability Enhances Dependability. 
The more reliable a system is the more dependable it becomes.  Reliability allows 
systems to be in use for more time in between mission aborts.  Longer missions become 
feasible when higher reliability is achieved.  These extended missions, without aborts, 
give users the perception that the system is more dependable. 
The current perception is that the most dependable protection systems are the 
massive armor packages currently employed throughout the operational environment.  
These massive armor packages are tangible, and thought to be very dependable and will 
not “let you down” when you need them.  Changing that perception will take time and 
success. (Wilson, 2004).  Armor, being a physical barrier that you can see and feel, adds 
to its perception of being effective.  The thicker the better, as long as you are not a 
logistician. The operational environment is fraught with instances, events, and effects that 
can quickly damage, or even destroy systems ill prepared for its challenges.  For instance, 
systems that are used for littoral combat (like most Marine Corps system are designed 
for) will need to deal with the extreme corrosive effects from salt-water spray.  To gain 
wide acceptance, an APS will need to be designed to take these destructive operational 
environments in stride and be survivable to their various effects.  System reliability will 
suffer if the APS experiences an unacceptable amount of mission failures when emplaced 
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in the intended operational environment, and a perception will quickly spread that the 
APS cannot be depended upon to protect the platform, or its crew.   
2. Maintainability Enhances Trust. 
 New systems require new habits to be formed. 
There will be a learning curve with the new systems, including how to 
maintain these systems.  The current plate armors are very simple to maintain.  Just clean 
the plates if they’re dirty, plug any holes where they appear, and replace the plates if they 
become too damaged.   
An APS will take more time, patience, and experience to maintain.  When 
an APS becomes dirty, personnel cannot just clean it off without considering how the 
cleaning procedures will affect the APS.  Abrasive cleaners that were available to clean 
off armor plates, may damage sensitive APS components.  Damaged components, 
especially if they are electronic, will also take different skills to repair.  For instance, if an 
armor plate is damaged by small arms fire, maintainers may only need to paint the 
damaged section or plug a hole, but if an APS is damaged by small arms fire, especially 
if the sensors for the APS are damaged, maintainers may need to replace major 
components.  There will also be software maintenance for an APS as well as hardware 
maintenance, which could lead to an increased training burden when these systems are 
first employed.   
Any APS will have a software package that is essential for the system’s 
threat response.  Software is not necessary for armor plates to protect the system they are 
employed upon.  So, these software suites will require maintainers to understand how to 
best maintain the software to maintain the protection provided by the APS.  Also, given 
their electronic systems, an APS may be more susceptible to environmental factors in the 
operational environment than comparable armor plates.  For example, an armor plate 
could be directly struck by lightning and arguably be unaffected, but an APS, and its 
electronic components, will likely be drastically affected from the same event. 
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 Experience with the systems may quickly build, but will not be 
immediate. 
Learning curves and maintenance needs can lead to questions as to 
whether or not the APS is a necessary addition to the platform.  There will be added 
workload to maintainers of an APS over their workload with a comparable plate armor 
package and questions may come up on whether or not this added workload is really 
making a difference.  Regrettably, one of the quickest ways for a protection system to 
gain notoriety and trust is for users to see the protection system in action: a body armor is 
hit, but not penetrated; a fragmentary grenade goes off and fragments become lodged in a 
helmet, but the wearer is protected; or a threat is detected by an APS, but users witness 
the APS effectively responding to the threat.  Another good example of this phenomenon 
is the spread of bar armors. 
Bar armors were designed to counteract specific threats, but they were 
initially seen as a nuisance and counterproductive by some of the personnel that first 
received them.  When they received their bar armor “upgrades,” the personnel suddenly 
found they couldn’t hang any of their gear off of the sides of their vehicle anymore, so 
they saw the bar armor as directly impeding their ability to complete their mission.  
However, as soon as the bar armor successfully defeated a threat, that hadn’t been 
adequately defeated before, word quickly spread on how great the bar armor was and that 
everyone needed an add-on armor kit.  Then the Army had a different problem on their 
hand: They couldn’t get bar armors out fast enough.  This bottleneck, and quick change 
in opinions, led to personnel fashioning their own bar armors out of whatever metal 
scraps they could find around themselves, and a configuration management nightmare.  
However, eventually, all of the bottlenecks were corrected and few vehicles leave the 
protective perimeter if they do not have some type of add-on armor (Wilson, 2004). 
 The old base armors will be viewed as trustworthy; APS need 
to build, and maintain, at least that same level of trust. 
The ability of the unit to maintain their APS with organic support will be 
essential in building, and maintaining, trust in the system.  Personnel that have recently 
been deployed are familiar with the massive systems designed to protect them.  
(Merle2007). When they are suddenly presented with a much more agile system, they 
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will be impressed, but they will be hesitant about the protection the system provides until 
they have enough experience to trust the system.  One of the best ways to build trust is to 
be reliably effective over time, and this means that you will need a strong maintenance 
program.  The goal will be to have a maintenance plan in place so the system can quickly 
be returned to service when there is a failure. 
Achieving  organic support, rather than the use of contractor Field Service 
Representatives (FSRs), as the primary mode of support is one way of gaining the units 
trust in the APS.  FSRs are typically contractors employed by a system developer who 
deployed with gaining units to service a system during the initial deployment when there 
usually a lack of technical orders to repair the APS. t Many service members will likely 
view the APS as just a “black box” if Field FSRs are the main mode of support.  This is 
what happened with the first jammers used in Iraq.  The jammers were viewed as a 
“black box,” or a device that works without really understanding its function and 
capability. This environment was created because the FSRs were tying into the platform’s 
power and giving the crew inside a switch to turn the jammer on.  The crew did not have 
full control over the jammer beyond that switch, and were sometimes skeptical about the 
function capability of the system.  (Wilson, 2004, p. A.19). 
Because a system was deployed without the logistics in place, service 
members did not understand the operational capability beyond the affixed warning labels 
when the jammers were first installed on vehicles.  After a few years, and with more  
electronic warfare officers, and some industrious maintenance technicians, the military 
determined  how the jammers functioned so that they could be repaired onsite without the 
FSRs’ help.  This resulted in  reduced wait times at the depot, and increased trust being 
on the system because of a better understanding functionally of the jammer, and how it 
affixed to their vehicle, that used to be a “black box.” (Wilson, 2004, p. A.19). 
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3. Availability Enhances Survivability 
 If the APS is not available then the system may not be 
survivable to threats. 
There conceivably, could be a platform that reduces weight, through 
removing armor plates, to the point where it would not be survivable against particular 
threats without the APS being effective.  These weight savings will be paramount for 
increasing off-road agility, automotive performance, and vehicle reliability for future 
systems.   
 Base armor is reduced due to APS presence. 
Typically, armor plating becomes thicker and thicker as it is tasked to 
defeat ever more effective threats, because armor plating provides survivability at the 
“Don’t be penetrated” level of the survivability onion as shown previously in the example 
of the Iron Curtain and comparable armor plate.  Armor plating is typically the last line of 
defense, beyond possible spall liners, between a perforating threat and the platform’s 
crew.  Any reduction in armor plating can lead to an overall reduction in platform weight, 
which can lead to higher automotive agility and vehicular performance.  This weight 
saving may also lead to better fuel consumption for like distances, could make logistic 
footprints smaller, and could result in better reliability of suspension components.  These 
benefits, and more, are the main reasons an APS would be used in lieu of added armor. 
 That system will not move if the APS is not available.   
When a platform’s base armor is reduced for economic and performance 
reasons, and an APS is emplaced to boost the survivability of the system against 
operationally relevant threats, availability of that APS will mean survivability of the 
platform in the eyes of decision makers.  This actually applies for most survivability 
upgrades, but one of the most recent is the fielding of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected 
(MRAP) vehicles early in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).   
The High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) was the 
prevalent mode of transportation for ground troops before OIF, because they were the 
most trusted form of ground transportation at the time.  However, the insurgents used this 
knowledge against the HMMWV, and emplaced underbody threats to exploit the 
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HMMWV’s light armor.  The underbody threats were so effective that personnel and 
materials were difficult to move anywhere across the country.  (Merle, 2007, p. D.1.)  
The MRAP vehicles were designed, or bought, and used as the main mode of ground 
transportation through areas where underbody threats were likely.  The MRAP vehicles 
became so effective at counteracting underbody threats (when compared to the 
HMMWV), that decision makers decided that HMMWVs were not allowed to leave 
bases and were confined to protective enclosures.  No one left their base on the ground if 
they were trying to leave in a HMMWV.  In short: A ground mission may not be run if a 
MRAP vehicle was not available to run it. 
The same will become true in the future with a platform that depends on 
an APS.  That platform may not be allowed off base if the APS it depends on for 
protection is not available.  
B. MAKE IMPROVEMENTS TO RELIABILITY AND MAINTAINABILITY 
AND SURVIVABILITY WILL IMPROVE 
By increasing the uptime (reliability improvements) and decreasing downtime 
(maintainability improvements), the availability of a system will improve.  By improving 
the availability, the survivability will, in turn, also improve as long as the APS systems 
are effective.  
1. Reliability Improvements 
According to the Army’s Center for Reliability Growth (presentation slides from 
Reliability Short Course, July 2010), the following are some ways to improve reliability 
that can be applied to the development of an APS:  
 Approach reliability by designing it in rather than only testing it in, with 
high-level and continuous focus on reliability improvement 
 Understand critical loads and stresses, even at component level 
 Conduct thermal and vibration analyses to address potential failure 
mechanisms/sites 
 Conduct low-level testing early in development to precipitate failures and 
improve design 
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 Conduct accelerated life testing for specific failure mechanisms and 
identify and implement corrective actions 
When potential failure modes are found early in the development of a system, 
there is usually time and funding to fix these issues prior to production.  By using Failure 
Modes Effect and Analysis (FMEA)/Failure Modes Effects and Criticality Analysis 
(FMECA) and employing a Failure Reporting, Analysis, and Corrective Action System 
(FRACAS), the contractor will be able to track the failed components and implement 
fixes prior to production and fielding.  The contractor can also perform Highly 
Accelerated Life Testing (HALT)/ Highly Accelerated Stress Screenings (HASS) or 
Physics of Failure (PoF) analysis in order to surface the failure modes sooner.  
a. FMEA/FMECA 
The FMEA/FMECA is a reliability evaluation/design technique which 
examines potential failure modes within a system and its equipment, in order to 
determine the effects on equipment and system performance 
(https://dap.dau.mil/acquipedia).   Each mode is classified according impact on mission 
success and safety to personnel and equipment.  It should be noted that the FMECA is 
composed of three separate analyses, the Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA), the 
Criticality Analysis (CA) and Risk Priority Analysis (RPA), and Critical Item Analysis 
(CIA) and Failure Compensation Analysis (FCA) (DoD, 2013). 
On its own, the FMEA aids in: determining the effect of each failure mode 
on performance; root cause identification and development of corrective actions; 
investigation of design alternatives; development of test methods and troubleshooting 
techniques; qualitative reliability and maintainability analyses; locating single point 
failures.  By adding the Criticality Analysis (to include the RPA, CIA, and FCA), the 
FMEA becomes a FMECA which additionally aids in: providing data for developing the 
Reliability Block Diagram and Fault Tree Analysis; qualitative safety and supportability 
analyses; ranking failure according to severity classification; estimating system critical 
failure rates; and identifying reliability and safety critical components. (Reliability 
Analysis Center, 1993). 
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b. FRACAS 
FRACAS is a closed-loop process for storing, organizing, and analyzing 
data; tracking failures and design modifications; and reporting results throughout an 
organization.  The kinds of data stored in a FRACAS include: failure reports, failure 
analysis, failure modes, design modifications, management decisions, configuration 
control, and lessons learned. (presentation slides from Reliability Short Course, July 
2010)  
c. HALT/HASS  
HALT methodology use stresses beyond what system would normally see 
in field use to compress test time required to expose weaknesses (flaws).  It is most 
effective in the design stage.  HASS methodology uses stresses beyond what system 
would normally see in field use to compress test time required to expose manufacturing 
flaws.  It is used during the manufacturing/production stage.  HALT/HASS are generally 
developed and used for electronics and electronic systems.  The following are examples 
of what could be varied during these tests: temperature, rate of change of temperature, 
vibration, voltage, power cycling, and humidity.  HALT/HASS could be used on the APS 
electronic systems such as the radar components. (presentation slides from Reliability 
Short Course, July 2010) 
d. PoF 
PoF examines the precise nature of why and how things fail; explores the 
chemistry and physics of how materials are affected by the processes of manufacturing, 
employment, and environment; and are usually specific to a given failure mechanism.  
(presentation slides from Reliability Short Course, July 2010) PoF models account for 
things, such as potential stresses, material properties, geometry, and environmental 
conditions of an item. Mechanical PoF can provide a number of benefits to the reliability 
of equipment at all stages of the acquisition process.  It can assist in assessing reliability 
during source selection; early identification of weak points in design; root cause of failure 
during testing; improvement in accuracy of accelerated life tests; update of reliability 
during usage; and assessment of upgrades and field kits.  For an APS, PoF could be 
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performed on the mounting brackets in order to determine if the fabricated hardware is 
strong enough to withstand the rough terrain of the operational environment.  
2. Maintainability Improvements 
Two ways to improve the maintainability of a system are by identifying all 
limited-life components and developing a cost effective replacement policy to maintain 
adequate reliability in its lifecycle; and by using “pit-stop” engineering to design the 
system to be easy to repair and replace.   
a. Preventative Maintenance 
By knowing the life of a component, a preventative maintenance schedule 
can be established.  For example, if it is known that a motor will stop working after one 
thousand hours of use, the preventative maintenance schedule could include a motor 
overhaul (or replacement) at 950 hours of operation preventing the system from failing 
during operation. 
b. Pit-Stop Engineering 
Pit-stop engineering/design was embedded in the now canceled Future 
Combat System.  According to Myles (2007, slide 8), “Pit-Stop design is an approach for 
designing maintainability in military systems that is derived from auto racing.  Emphasis 
is on the simplicity of design to minimize downtime due to repair.” Some of the 
characteristics of this design approach include designing the component packaging to 
minimize weight and volume; using modular design to allow for commonality, upgrades, 
and quick repair/replacement; reducing the number of tools required; including handles 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
A. CONCLUSION 
An APS is essential in protecting a service member’s equipment and more 
importantly, surviving a penetration.  It is important that the system is reliable, 
maintainable, available, and survivable.  Currently, the effects of RAM are not 
considered when assessing the survivability of acquisition systems.   
When RAM is included in the Survivability Onion, both survivability and RAM 
evaluations benefit, survivability assessments become more complete, RAM assessments 
are completed sooner, and ultimately better systems are put into the hands of our service 
members. 
The service member has to be able to depend on his/her piece of equipment to 
function properly.  They must be able to trust that their equipment will be ready for use at 
a moment’s notice. If a system is not reliable and maintainable, it will not be available for 
use.  If the system is not available, it cannot be used to protect the Service Member.   
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
As APS requirements are developed, it is important that they include the Materiel 
Availability KPP with associated Reliability and Ownership Cost KSAs.  Reliability 
needs to be designed into the system at the beginning of development to ensure a robust 
system.  Maintenance metrics also need to be considered in order to minimize the 
logistics footprint.  Pit stop engineering should be utilized, by making the system easy to 
repair, resulting in less downtime, increased availability, and higher survivability.  By 
determining the most effective schedule for preventative maintenance, the unit will be 
able to stop failures before they occur.  This will ensure that the system is in full working 
condition prior to leaving on a mission with confidence that their APS will stop incoming 
threats.   
It is recommended that early testing occurs on sensitive components of an APS.  
This can include HALT/HASS as well as PoF activities. It is important to make sure that 
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all electronic components will function properly and all mounting brackets hold after 
being shaken and jostled while driving through rough terrain.   
When evaluating an APS (or any system) the independent evaluator team 
members need to integrate and discuss the impacts of the capabilities and limitations they 
observed with each other to ensure that the deficiencies are properly addressed in the 
reports. For example, if the RAM evaluator notices that the maintenance times are high, 
the survivability evaluator needs to determine how this will impact the ability of the 
system to protect the Service Member. 
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